Ed Markey — Senator Markey on Illicit Export of Ballistic Missile Technology from China to Iran

a secretary countryman last spring this committee held a hearing on the new us-china civil nuclear cooperation agreement during that hearing we discuss very credible allegations about China's inability or as I suggested unwillingness to enforce its commitments to prevent bad actors like Carl Lee from selling ballistic missile technology to Iran North Korea and other countries of concern as has been discussed here today Iran has conducted two ballistic missile tests in the past few weeks in violation of UN Security Council resolution 1929 which countries do you believe are providing ballistic missile technologies to Iran mr.

secretary my assessment is the same as it was this spring that the primary source of advanced missile advanced technology for Iran's ballistic missile program our companies in China I believe the Chinese government has stepped up its efforts to enforce its own laws and UN sanctions however I cannot say that they have reached a satisfactory port of enforcement yep it's so again that continues to be my very serious concern it was my concern about the approval of the China civil nuclear agreement without conditions attached to it now I did not have the support on this committee or in the Senate to attach those conditions but those conditions would have imposed upon China of requirements to put in place the safeguards against Collie and others transferring ballistic missiles into Iran and into North Korea and to other countries i mean we essentially have the equivalent of the nuclei of materials which I think are now under very close safeguards being the bullets but the missiles are the guns and we're in a gun control discussion here today ballistic missiles that can deliver those nuclear bullets to other in the world and China is the gun manufacturer and and so from my perspective we missed a great opportunity here to condition that agreement I think we should have because this whole discussion on ballistic missiles now goes back to that China agreement since they are from the administration's perspective the most likely source of the ballistic missile technology and we had a lot of leverage at that point I argued that we should condition it at that time but again I think it was a great historic missed opportunity to draw a line on nuclear proliferation issues to create the linkages so that we could have in one year put top safeguards on the bullet program the nuclear materials program and on the gun program the ballistic missile delivery that was China though not Iran they'll receive whatever can come through clandestinely and as long as kylie and people like that are able to move around china with impunity i think we're going to continue to have a very serious problem and we might as well just have the hearing on that subject you know because that's the ballistic missile discussion in iran and it's going to be other countries like china who believe that notwithstanding their public support for gun control that they find their own way around a relatively poorly enforced restriction because we don't step up and use our leverage when the historic opportunity arrives and that was the china civilian nuclear agreement if anything was directly related to iran and its nuclear program it was what china was looking for at that point to have that discussion didn't happen so so going forward having lost that opportunity what else do we have as a tool to let China know how serious we are about this and how we don't intend on countenancing a circumvention of an international agreement at the entire world at least ostensibly says that they believe is very important to long-term global stability well briefly I will be in Beijing again next month I don't wish to have whatever I say they're dismissed his finger wagging because I think it will be a pretty strong message but I also can't predict and can't forecast at this moment what additional actions we will take against Chinese entities that are complicit in providing ballistic missile technology I'll only say as we said earlier that under active consideration right now are additional effective measures in response to the October 10th test I appreciate that I think it's inadequate I don't think it's you know going to actually have the kind of weight force behind it that rejection of our conditioning of the China civilian nuclear agreement would have but again it just continues to raise the whole question of China up above nuclear 123 agreements the very high hypocrisy coefficient that it then sends out as a message to the rest of the world and and I would hope that mr.

chairman next year that we take up once again you know the 123 agreement of climate that we've created around the world where we are suppliers ourselves and unfortunately turn a blind eye too often to other guns suppliers who are out there who do not believe that there is going to be a sufficiently well enforced international response when it's clear that there are violations which are taking place and I don't think there's any question that Kali is the gun dealer the ballistic missile dealer one of them anyway but at the top of the list and that this still is not sufficient Chinese response to it and I don't think this sufficient response from our own countries perspective on it I just think we have to take a harder line on it and there's really no point in trying to convince people that Iran is sincere if they're engaging in an ongoing clandestine ballistic missile program with supplies coming in from China you know that just leaves the very clear impression that we're just in a temporary period of advance before they attach the bullets to the top of these ballistic missiles okay and that's really a cynical approach which they're taking the Chinese are taking and I just think that we had an opportunity but I think we have to focus upon this next year I think we need those hearings so that we come back to this China question once again Thank You mr.

chairman