Ed Markey — SFRC Hearing: U.S. Role & Strategy in the Middle East: The Humanitarian Crisis

secretary Miliband I have been and remain a skeptic of policy recommendations that increase the risk of Americanization of westernization of the armed complex in Iraq and Syria and I would much rather see us work to influence parties towards internal compromises necessary to end violence and work together to establish governments that fully represent and fairly treat all people most recently we have heard that US policy may be moving towards creation of so-called safe zones long advocated by turkey just last week retired General Petraeus called for us to create quote enclaves in Syria protected by coalition airpower where a moderate Sunni force could be supported and where additional forces could be trained internally displaced persons could find refuge and the Syrian opposition could organize but on September 16th here in the Foreign Relations Committee we heard testimony from Michael Bowers of Mercy Corps who told us that such zones cannot be considered safe I have been advised that there are three requirements for true effective humanitarian safe zones one parties to the armed conflict must agree to the creation of the zone and to respect it to the zone must be secured by an impartial force with sufficient capability in size and it is critical that this force not be a party to the conflict our supporter of any party to the conflict three the zone must be demilitarized meaning that it must not be a base for any military activity operations by parties to the conflict and this must be rigorously enforced by the impartial security force in August the un special envoy for Syria stephane de mr.

and mr. ax completed a round of consultations that the UN Security Council has endorsed secretary Miliband could you provide your perspective on how the p5 in the entire international community can focus diplomatic support for his efforts more specifically how might such a process create true humanitarian safe zones in Syria that meet two criteria I just mentioned thank you Miss and said I'd say two things first of all your skepticism about military engagement is widely shared and I know that you've have anot been a skeptic about engagement internationally generally and I think the greater the skepticism about the military side the greater the responsibility to act on the humanitarian and the political secondly i said earlier that i thought that in the debate about safe zones no-fly zones it was important to move from slogans to details which is what you've done and also learn the lessons of history because all of us actually my colleagues here with far more personal experience than me it can speak to the different ways in which different tactics for the establishment of safe zones have worked or have not worked and where i can comment and that the well-known example of the kurds in 1991 who were protected versus the cerebral needs for example in a way one of my frustrations is that we've got to go beyond just using those two examples as clubs with which to beat the argument we need to get right underneath the details because the truth to my mind is that the situation in syria and iraq at the moment is unlike anything else that we've seen before and we need to learn from history but not be imprisoned by it um you asked about the diplomatic and political engagement I said in my opening statement that it is extraordinary to look not just the numbers of people affected by this crisis but the absence of political engagement either from the great powers or from the regional powers on the political front the the stephane de Mistura mission is does not have the active ongoing engaged King on a day-to-day basis of the nation's who voted for the establishment of his office and that contrasts with the situation the Balkans where there was successive contact groups and other formations of the p5 their permanent Security Council and others to try to put political and diplomatic muscle behind the dense now the many times those attempts failed to record to resolve the Balkan crisis but nonetheless there was the the effort and I think that I would argue for as inclusive a process as possible because that reflects the realities on the ground and for a process as structured and urgent as possible secondly and thirdly for a process that doesn't leave the humanitarian situation last was often in these diplomatic I don't like to their games but diplomatic enterprises the humanitarian situation is seen as an add-on whereas to my mind it may well be that the humanitarian situation provides the way in for a contact group rather than the conclusion of a contact route and it's in that light that I suggested that this notion of humanitarian envoy's appointed by the p5 heads of state but also by the regional powers to start with some what should be unbreakable rules and that seems to me to be at least a plausible hypothesis about a way an international effort could be geared if I could just underscore two points I would first of all emphasize that now that this crisis has reached the shores of Europe it it does catalyze a renewed focus and the humanitarian crisis is an important way in it is now the leading edge of this crisis as it presents globally and secondly it's very dangerous to conflate military approaches with civilian protection and any approach that conflates those goals I think is very is is a perilous way forward you agree wool with the three-point program that I laid out do you eat your gear with that that's a better approach I i yes although I would fully subscribe to David's advice that we that we have a detailed conversation based I appear but in principle the sanctuary for the refugees can't also be the military base to a crack you all agree with that so I think that's a contrast with General Petraeus and I think it's important for us to you know put that out here on the table because that's I think central to this issue and i am mr.

Chairman I wanted to ask an additional question about Yemen but sure i can wait is that a ring I would just out of curiosity since we understand your point of view and i think david miliband us too are you saying on the other hand that you would support us intervention to stop the barrel bombing if it was not about military activity taking place within that safe zone but protection of civilians press key no I'm asking you that I just out of curiosity I just heard y'all um because that'd be a breakthrough I think the breakthrough honestly has to be Obama and Yeltsin I'm you open from an impudent sitting down and reaching an agreement on this okay and I think that's the only way was going to happen I think any other intervention is not going to be effective in the long run I think we need a political resolution of this and we need everything on the table and we need the major powers to get this back out of the Cold War framework which its back into so that's my view data in this human thank you okay yeah no apology just for the record mr.

chairman before I get all my organization gets signed up to propel oh no can I say this you did not answer okay yeah yeah you're saying Mike quick I just want to say that Nancy's point about details really matters so let's just take the example of a demilitarized zone a demilitarized zone in an area in a country which is flooded with arms of all kinds is is a nice aspiration but doesn't speak to the detail of the situation on the ground I would suggest that the the imperative is to look at what a detailed proposal actually is and then measure it against the situation on the ground and the objectives that are set for it was in the end it's the application of the principles that's going to matter and frankly the devil is in the detail and my goodness we've seen that in the last few Israel thank you thank you just quickly miss Lombardi looking back to last winter and spring it seems that we were on autopilot to reflexively support a Saudi decision to intervene in Yemen without a full examination of alternatives what are your thoughts on this what do we need to do to assess what we might have done differently last winter and spring particularly diplomatically in the run-up to outside military intervention in Yemen well I would I would answer it this way we're seeing where the military intervention is preventing humanitarian assistance from reaching populations that were very very vulnerable to begin with and we are already seeing the beginning of pockets of famine in Yemen and if there isn't an ability to provide assistance on a more regular basis including the ability of ships to dock because Yemen is deeply dependent upon imports of fuel and critical food supplies it's also running critically short of water as we know there will be massive widespread famine and it will I think there's an important conversation to be had with both Saudi and Iran as to whether their military objectives are worth that kind of broad spread human what can we do to help to de-escalate the violence so we can get the humanitarian aid into those who need it what would you recommend that we do what's the policy I would I would increase the the pressure to at a minimum create a regular cycle of humanitarian pauses so that there can be a regular eyes debility to get assistance in including ships that can get in and regularly offload in on load there's clearly a need for the bigger diplomatic resolution of the conflict but in the absence of that there needs to be a way to keep the country from tipping into famine okay Thank You mr.

chairman a secretary Miliband was the leading voice in Great Britain on climate change and I know how he knows how he interacts with and water crises that then further exacerbates all these problems but I know my time has run out but I just wanted to thank you publicly for all the work you've done in your career secretary